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Abstract
We study customization in a duopoly game in which the firms’ products have different qual-
ities. Whether customization choices are made simultaneously or sequentially is endogenously
determined. Specifically, the customization stage of the game involves two periods. Each firm
either selects its product type in period 1 or postpones this decision to period 2. We show
that both quality and endogenous timing play important roles in determining the equilibrium
outcome. Customization occurs only if the quality difference is sufficiently large. Endogenous
timing sometimes enables the firms to achieve an outcome that is Pareto superior to that if they
were to make their customization choices simultaneously. Although the higher quality firm is
more likely to customize, endogenous timing sometimes enables the lower quality firm to obtain
an advantage that it would not have under simultaneous customization choices.
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1 Introduction
Customization is a flexible computer-aided technology designed to produce individually tailored
products without significantly compromising cost efficiency. For example, Dell builds to order note-
book and desktop computers; NikeID.com allows consumers to create their most preferred athletic
pair of shoes; Timbuk2 customizes messenger bags and backpacks; apparel vendor LandsEnd.com
offers custom-crafted pants and shirts.
Most of the existing theoretical literature on customization adopt one-dimensional horizontal
differentiation settings (e.g., Dewan et al. 2003, Syam and Kumar 2006, Alexandrov 2008, and
Mendelson and Parlaktu¨rk 2008). Customization enables consumers to get their ideal products
represented by their locations in the product attribute space. Firms are symmetrical and make
symmetric choices in equilibrium.1 Even though many important aspects of customization are
captured by these studies, important issues have yet to be examined. Casual empiricism indicates
that (i) some firms customize, some do not; (ii) firms may not make their customization choices at
the same time; and (iii) higher quality firms are more likely to offer customization. The goal of the
present paper as well as Loginova and Wang (2008) is to incorporate these observations into product
customization competition.
We consider an industry in which products are characterized by variety and quality. Variety is a
horizontal attribute and quality is a vertical attribute.2 Consumer preferences are heterogenous in
two dimensions. In particular, each consumer has a most preferred variety and a quality valuation.
There are two firms that initially produce standard products located at the end points of the variety
space. The firms are asymmetrical due to having different qualities. Customization provides ideal
varieties for consumers but has no effect on product qualities. The model has two stages, the
customization stage followed by the pricing stage. In Loginova and Wang (2008), the customization
stage involves a single period in which the firms simultaneously decide whether to customize their
products. In the present paper, the customization stage unfolds in two periods. Each firm either
selects its product type in period 1 or postpones this decision to period 2. Thus, whether the
customization choices are made simultaneously or sequentially is endogenously determined. While
Loginova and Wang (2008) addresses issues related to observations (i) and (iii) above, this paper
concerns all three observations by introducing endogenous timing into the customization stage.
Industrial organization economists have long been interested in whether firms choose their prices
and/or quantities simultaneously or sequentially. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, 1993) were the first
to introduce a model in which the determination of simultaneity versus sequentiality of moves is
endogenous.3 The game structure for the customization stage in this paper follows Hamilton and
Slutsky (1993), in which the basic game is given by a 2× 2 matrix and the extended game has two
periods. This is the simplest possible setup to model firms’ flexibility in choosing when to move.
1An exception is Mendelson and Parlaktu¨rk (2008) in which asymmetric firms are considered.
2Our basic model is based on the literature that combines horizontal and vertical differentiation, e.g., Economides
(1989) and Neven and Thisse (1990).
3Many subsequent studies have examined endogenous timing and related issues in standard price and/or quantity
duopoly games, e.g., Matsumura (1999) and Amir and Stepanova (2006).
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The paper on customization that is closest to ours is Syam et al. (2005). In all three papers
the consumer space is two-dimensional. Syam et al. (2005) endow products with two horizontal
attributes, for which consumers have heterogeneous preferences. The firms are initially maximally
differentiated with respect to both attributes. They first simultaneously choose whether to customize
both, one, or none of the attributes, then compete in prices. The key difference between Syam et
al. (2005) and our studies is that they work with ex ante symmetric firms and examine how the
possibility of customizing multiple attributes affect customization choices, whereas we work with
asymmetric firms and focus on the roles of quality difference and endogenous timing in customization
competition.
Another closely related paper is Bernhardt et al. (2007), in which ex ante symmetric firms first
acquire information about consumers and then customize their products as best as they can to match
consumer needs. Similar to our papers, consumer preferences are two-dimensional, corresponding
to two attributes of the product, and the second attribute – brand loyalty – cannot be customized.
There are two main differences between Bernhardt et al. (2007) and our studies. First, Bernhardt
et al. (2007) emphasize the cost side of customization, whereas our focus is shifted towards the
strategic effects of customization. Second, brand loyalty is a horizontal attribute, not vertical as
quality in our papers is.
Several other papers have studied customization using a one-dimensional consumer space. Dewan
et al. (2003) assume that customizing firms price discriminate. Syam and Kumar (2006) examine
the role of standard products in customization competition. Alexandrov (2008) extends Salop’s
(1979) model in which firms can offer interval-long adjustable “fat” products. While these three
studies assume symmetric firms, in Mendelson and Parlaktu¨rk (2008) one firm has margin advantage
(higher difference between reservation price and unit cost) over the other.
Our papers as well as Syam et al. (2005) model customization as zero-one decisions, so that
all customers of a customizing firm get their most preferred varieties. In contrast, all the other
papers mentioned above treat customization as continuous choices. Both approaches match aspects
of reality and have their advantages. With zero-one decisions, more attention can be devoted to
the strategic effects of customization. With continuous customization choices, one can focus on how
efficiency considerations determine the range of customization.
Our equilibrium analysis shows that quality difference and endogenous timing play important
roles in determining the equilibrium outcome. In particular, no firm will customize if the quality
difference is small, regardless of the fixed cost of customization. Intuitively, customization by one or
both firms makes their products less differentiated, thus intensifying price competition. The smaller
is the quality difference, the tougher is price competition. For sufficiently large quality differences,
customization by one or both firms may occur. Because the high quality firm benefits more from
customization than the low quality firm, the high quality firm is more likely to customize.
We show that the endogeneity of timing in the customization stage is an additional strategic tool
for the firms. It sometimes enables the firms to achieve an outcome that is Pareto superior to that
if they were to make their customization decisions simultaneously. While in Loginova and Wang
(2008) the low quality firm never customizes alone, in the present model it can obtain an advantage
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by becoming the first and only firm to customize in some circumstances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. In
Section 3 the pricing stage of the game is analyzed. In Section 4 we study the firms’ customization
choices. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a market in which each product i is characterized by its variety xi ∈ [0, 1] and its quality
qi ≥ 0. The first characteristic corresponds to horizontal differentiation and the second to vertical
differentiation. Consumers are heterogenous in two dimensions. Each consumer has a most preferred
variety x ∈ [0, 1] and a quality valuation y ∈ [0, 1]. A consumer of type (x, y) derives the following
utility from buying one unit of product i:
v + qiy − t|x− xi| − pi,
where v is a positive constant, t is a preference parameter, and pi is the price of product i. Consumers
as represented by (x, y) are uniformly distributed over the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] with a total mass
of 1. We assume that v is large enough for all consumers to find a product that yields positive payoff
in equilibrium.
There are two firms, A and B, operating with zero marginal costs of production. Initially, firm
A offers a single (standard) product of quality qA and variety xA = 0, whereas firm B offers a single
product of quality qB > qA and variety xB = 1. That is, firm B is the higher quality firm and the
two firms have maximum variety differentiation.
We will normalize t to 1. This amounts to a monotonic transformation of preferences. The
utilities of a consumer of type (x, y) from buying firm A’s and firm B’s standard products are
v + qAy − x− pA (1)
and
v + qBy − (1− x)− pB, (2)
respectively.
Investing K ≥ 0 into product-customization technology allows a firm to produce a product that
exactly matches a given consumer’s preferred variety. The utilities of type (x, y) from buying firm
A’s and firm B’s customized products are
v + qAy − pA (3)
and
v + qBy − pB. (4)
4
Sfirm A
C W
firm B
S
(
ΠSSA
ΠSS
B
)
C
(
ΠSCA
ΠSC
B
−K
)
W WS
(
ΠCSA −K
ΠCS
B
)
C
(
ΠCCA −K
ΠCC
B
−K
)
S C W
S
(
ΠSSA
ΠSS
B
)
firm B
C
(
ΠSCA
ΠSC
B
−K
)
S
(
ΠCSA −K
ΠCS
B
)
firm B
C
(
ΠCCA −K
ΠCC
B
−K
)
S
(
ΠSSA
ΠSS
B
)
firm A
C
(
ΠCSA −K
ΠCS
B
)
C
(
ΠCCA −K
ΠCC
B
−K
)
S
(
ΠSCA
ΠSC
B
−K
)
firm A
S
firm A
C
firm B
S
(
ΠSSA
ΠSS
B
)
C
(
ΠSCA
ΠSC
B
−K
)
S
(
ΠCSA −K
ΠCS
B
)
C
(
ΠCCA −K
ΠCC
B
−K
)
Figure 1: Customization stage
There are two stages in the game. The first stage – customization stage – unfolds in two periods.
In period 1 the firms choose simultaneously between selecting their product types (standard or
customized) this period or wait until period 2. We use S, C, and W to denote these three choices.
If both firms selected their product types in period 1, the game proceeds to the second stage. If
one firm chose to wait in period 1, it must select its product type in period 2. If both firms chose
to wait in period 1, they simultaneously select their product types in period 2. A firm selecting a
customized product incurs fixed cost K.
The second stage of the game is the pricing stage. The firms choose simultaneously their prices,
taking as given the product types selected in the customization stage. Consumers observe prices
and make their purchasing decisions.
We adopt the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and use backward induction to solve the game.
Figure 1 depicts the reduced extensive form of the game. In this figure ΠA and ΠB are the firms’
equilibrium profits in the pricing stage (presented in the next section). Superscripts SS, CS, SC,
and CC correspond to the four possible outcomes of the first stage.
3 Analysis of the Pricing Stage
In this section we derive the firms’ equilibrium prices and profits in the second stage of the game.
3.1 Equilibrium Prices Following SS
Suppose both firms selected standard products in the customization stage. Utilities from firm A’s
and firm B’s standard products are given by (1) and (2). Therefore, for a given level of quality
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Figure 2: Indifference line and market areas
valuation y, the marginal consumer type in terms of variety x is
x̂(y) =
1
2
(1− qy + pB − pA) , (5)
where
q ≡ qB − qA
denotes the quality difference between products of firm B and firm A. For any y ∈ [0, 1], consumers
in the interval x ∈ [0, x̂(y)] will purchase from firm A, whereas those with x ∈ (x̂(y), 1] will purchase
from firm B. There are four possible positions for the indifference line (5), as illustrated in Figure 2.
Let DA(pA, pB) and DB(pA, pB) denote the demand functions of firms A and B. The expressions
for these functions depend on the position of the indifference line.4 The firms choose simultaneously
pA and pB to maximize their profits,
ΠA(pA, pB) = DA(pA, pB)pA
and
ΠB(pA, pB) = DB(pA, pB)pB.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium prices and profits following SS). Suppose both firms selected standard prod-
ucts in the first stage, then the equilibrium prices and profits in the second stage are as follows.
(i) If q ≤ 3/2, {
pSSA = 1− 16q
pSSB = 1 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠSSA =
1
2
(
1− 16q
)2
ΠSSB =
1
2
(
1 + 16q
)2
(ii) If q ∈ (3/2, 3],
{
pSSA =
1
8
(
1 +
√
1 + 16q
)
pSSB =
1
8
(−5 + 3√1 + 16q) and

ΠSSA =
1
q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)3
ΠSSB =
(
1− 1q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)2) −5+3√1+16q
8
4The details are provided in the proof of Lemma 1.
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(iii) If q > 3, {
pSSA =
1
3q
pSSB =
2
3q
and
{
ΠSSA =
1
9q
ΠSSB =
4
9q
It is easy to verify that the corresponding prices and profits vary continuously as q changes.
Case (i) corresponds to Figure 2(a), case (ii) to 2(b), and case (iii) to 2(c). Figure 2(d) does not
arise in equilibrium. In all three cases the higher quality firm B sets a higher price, serves a larger
market area, and earns a higher profit than firm A.
3.2 Equilibrium Prices Following CS
Suppose firm A selected a customized product and firm B selected a standard product in the cus-
tomization stage. Utilities from firm A’s customized product and firm B’s standard product are
given by (3) and (2). Therefore, for a given y, the marginal consumer type in terms of x is
x̂(y) = 1− qy + pB − pA, (6)
from which we can calculate the demand and profit functions for the firms. Lemma 2 presents the
equilibrium following CS.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium prices and profits following CS). Suppose firm A selected a customized
product and firm B selected a standard product in the first stage, then the equilibrium prices and
profits in the second stage are as follows.
(i) If q ≤ 1, {
pCSA =
2
3 − 16q
pCSB =
1
3 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠCSA =
(
2
3 − 16q
)2
ΠCSB =
(
1
3 +
1
6q
)2
(ii) If q > 1, {
pCSA =
1
3q +
1
6
pCSB =
2
3q − 16
and
{
ΠCSA =
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2
ΠCSB =
1
q
(
2
3q − 16
)2
The pricing equilibrium following CS leads to only two positions of the indifference line. Case
(i) corresponds to Figure 2(a). Customization enables firm A to overcome its quality disadvantage.
Firm A’s price, market size, and profit are higher than those of firm B. Case (ii) corresponds to
Figure 2(c). When the quality difference is large, firm A’s price, market size, and profit are lower
than those of firm B.
3.3 Equilibrium Prices Following SC
Suppose firm A selected a standard product and firm B selected a customized product in the cus-
tomization stage. Utilities from firm A’s standard product and firm B’s customized product are
given by (1) and (4). Therefore, for a given y, the marginal consumer type in terms of x is
x̂(y) = −qy + pB − pA. (7)
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The next lemma presents the equilibrium following SC.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium prices and profits following SC). Suppose firm A selected a standard product
and firm B selected a customized product in the first stage, then the equilibrium prices and profits
in the second stage are as follows.
(i) If q ≤ 1/2, {
pSCA =
1
3 − 16q
pSCB =
2
3 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠSCA =
(
1
3 − 16q
)2
ΠSCB =
(
2
3 +
1
6q
)2
(ii) If q ∈ (1/2, 2], {
pSCA =
1
4
√
2q
pSCB =
3
4
√
2q
and
{
ΠSCA =
1
16
√
2q
ΠSCB =
9
16
√
2q
(iii) If q > 2, {
pSCA =
1
3q − 16
pSCB =
2
3q +
1
6
and
{
ΠSCA =
1
q
(
1
3q − 16
)2
ΠSCB =
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2
Case (i) corresponds to Figure 2(a), case (ii) to 2(b), and case (iii) to 2(c). Firm B’s quality
advantage is reinforced by customization, pushing the critical values lower compared to those in
Lemma 1.
3.4 Equilibrium Prices Following CC
Suppose both firms selected customized products in the first stage. Utilities from firm A’s and firm
B’s customized products are given by (3) and (4). Therefore, consumers with y ≤ (pB − pA)/q will
purchase from firm A, those with y > (pB − pA)/q will purchase from firm B. The firms’ profit
functions are
ΠA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(pB − pA) pA and ΠB(pA, pB) = 1
q
(q + pA − pB) pB.
The profit maximizing first-order conditions{
pB − 2pA = 0
q + pA − 2pB = 0
lead immediately to the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Equilibrium prices and profits following CC). Suppose both firms selected customized
products in the first stage, then the equilibrium prices and profits in the second stage are given by:{
pCCA =
1
3q
pCCB =
2
3q
and
{
ΠCCA =
1
9q
ΠCCB =
4
9q
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In equilibrium the indifference line is horizontal at 1/3 from the bottom side of the unit square.
That is, firm A serves all consumers with quality valuations less than 1/3, and firm B serves the
rest. The result here is the same as in the standard model of vertical differentiation.
4 Analysis of the Customization Stage
It is left to analyze the customization stage depicted in Figure 1, further referred to as the endogenous-
timing game. It is crucial to first consider the simultaneous game in which product selection takes
place in a single period (i.e., waiting is not an option).
4.1 The Simultaneous Game
The normal form of the simultaneous game is
Firm B
Firm A
S C
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
(8)
Note that all possible payoffs of the endogenous-timing game, shown in Figure 1, appear in this
matrix.5 It follows that
(S,S)
(C,S)
(S,C)
(C,C)
 is a Nash equilibrium if

K ≥ max {c1, r1}
K ∈ [r2, c1]
K ∈ [c2, r1]
K ≤ min {c2, r2}
where
c1 ≡ ΠCSA −ΠSSA and c2 ≡ ΠCCA −ΠSCA
denote firm A’s change in gross profit in the two columns, and
r1 ≡ ΠSCB −ΠSSB and r2 ≡ ΠCCB −ΠCSB
denote firm B’s change in gross profit in the two rows.
The inequality
max{c1, c2} < min{r1, r2} (9)
holds for any value of q. Detailed expressions for c1, c2, r1, and r2 as functions of q and the proof
of (9) are provided in the Appendix. Inequality (9) stipulates that the low quality firm A always
gains less from customization than the high quality firm B. It follows that the simultaneous game
5Matrix (8) is also a normal form representation of the period 2 subgame following the choice of W by both firms
in the endogenous-timing game.
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Figure 3: Customization choices in the simultaneous game
has a unique Nash equilibrium except for K = c2 and K = r1. For ease of presentation without
affecting the results, we will select (C,C) as the Nash equilibrium at K = c2 and (S,C) at K = r1.
Accordingly,
(S,S)
(S,C)
(C,C)
 is the Nash equilibrium if

K > r1
K ∈ (c2, r1]
K ≤ c2
as shown in Figure 3. Stated in terms of q and K, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium customization choices in the simultaneous game). The following holds
for the firms’ equilibrium customization choices in the simultaneous game.
(i) If q ≤ 0.56 then the Nash equilibrium is (S,S) for any value of K.
(ii) If q ∈ (0.56, 0.63] then the Nash equilibrium is (S,C) for K ≤ r1 and (S,S) for K > r1.
(iii) If q > 0.63 then the Nash equilibrium is (C,C) for K ≤ c2, (S,C) for K ∈ (c2, r1], and (S,S)
for K > r1.
Based on this proposition, customization can occur in the simultaneous game only if q > 0.56.
This is true even if customization is costless. For q > 0.56, as customization becomes more expensive
(K increases), the equilibrium customization choices change from both firms customizing to only
firm B customizing, and to no firm customizing. Note that the low quality firm A never customizes
alone.
The intuition behind the results of Proposition 1 is as follows. Customization by one or both
firms makes their products less differentiated, intensifying price competition. The smaller is the
quality difference, the tougher is price competition. Therefore, when q is small, the firms do not
customize in order to avoid a price war. When q is large, one or both firms customize to take
advantage of consumers’ desires for ideal varieties.
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Before moving to the endogenous-timing game, we present the following two lemmas.
Lemma 5 (Outcome SS versus outcome CC). ΠSSA ≥ ΠCCA and ΠSSB ≥ ΠCCB for any value of q.
This lemma stipulates that both firms fare better when they produce standard products than
when they customize, even if the fixed cost of customization is zero. Obviously, this is due to the
reduced competition in outcome SS compared to CC.
Lemma 6 (Outcome SC versus outcome CS). ΠSCA +Π
SC
B > Π
CS
A +Π
CS
B for any value of q.
Intuitively, customization makes the low quality firm more aggressive than it does the high quality
firm. Hence, price competition following outcome CS is more fierce compared to that following SC.
This is responsible for the result in Lemma 6 that the industry profit is higher when the high quality
firm customizes than when the low quality firm customizes.
4.2 The Endogenous-Timing Game
Our analysis of the endogenous-timing game applies directly the results in Hamilton and Slutsky
(1993). Because the simultaneous game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, either the
Nash equilibrium is in dominant strategies, or it involves one dominant strategy.6 When the Nash
equilibrium is in dominant strategies, the order of product type selection in the endogenous-timing
game does not matter. This occurs when K is neither in between c1 and c2 nor in between r1 and
r2. There are multiple subgame perfect equilibria yielding a unique outcome that coincides with the
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game. More specifically, the following holds.
• If K ≤ min{c1, c2}, then both firms select customized products.
• If K ∈ (max{c1, c2},min{r1, r2}], then firm A selects a standard product and firm B selects a
customized product.
• If K > max{r1, r2}, then both firms select standard products.
When the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game involves only one dominant strategy,
the endogenous-timing game may lead to different customization choices.7 This occurs when K
is either in between c1 and c2 or in between r1 and r2. Hence, it is left to investigate the four
regions highlighted in Figure 4. As in Hamilton and Slutsky (1993), we will focus on equilibria in
undominated strategies.
Region I
Here, we have K ∈ (c1, c2]. The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game is (C,C) and only firm
B has a dominant strategy. Applying backward induction to the endogenous-timing game leads to
6See Lemma I of Hamilton and Slutsky (1993).
7See Theorem III of Hamilton and Slutsky (1993).
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Figure 4: Regions in which NE of the simultaneous game has one dominant strategy
the following 3× 3 payoff matrix for the period 1 strategies:
Firm B
Firm A
S C W
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
W ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
CC
A −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
(10)
This matrix deserves a discussion. The upper left 2 × 2 submatrix is obvious. Cell (W,W) reflects
the fact that (C,C) is the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game. If in period 1 firm A selects
its product type and firm B waits, then in period 2 firm B’s best response is to customize. This is
reflected in the off-diagonal cells of the last column, (S,W) and (C,W). If in period 1 firm B selects
its product type and firm A waits, then in period 2 firm A will match firm B’s selection (cells (W,S)
and (W,C) in the matrix).
Because K ∈ (c1, c2],
ΠSSA > Π
CS
A −K and ΠCCA −K ≥ ΠSCA ,
W weakly dominates S and C for firm A. From Lemma 5,
ΠSSB > Π
CC
B −K
holds for any q and K in region I. It follows that firm B will select a standard product against
waiting by firm A. The unique Nash equilibrium for matrix (10) in undominated strategies is (W,S).
The outcome corresponding to this equilibrium is SS.8 Observe that, by Lemma 5, this outcome is
8Matrix (10) has two Nash equilibria in weakly dominated strategies (C,C) and (C,W), with outcome CC.
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Pareto superior to that in the simultaneous game.
Region II
In this region, K ∈ (c2, c1]. The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game is (S,C) and only firm
B has a dominant strategy. Applying backward induction leads to the following game matrix for
period 1:
Firm B
Firm A
S C W
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
W ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
(11)
This matrix differs from matrix (10) in the last row. If in period 1 firm B selects its product type
and firm A waits, then in period 2 firm A’s best reply will be to make a different selection from
firm B’s. This is reflected in cells (W,S) and (W,C). Cell (W,W) is due to the fact that (S,C) is the
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
It follows from K ∈ (c2, c1] that waiting is a weakly dominant strategy for firm A. We show in
the Appendix that for any q and K in region II
ΠSCB −K > ΠCSB . (12)
Hence, firm B will choose either C or W against firm A’s waiting. The Nash equilibria for matrix
(11) in undominated strategies are (W,C) and (W,W). Both yield outcome SC, the same as in the
simultaneous game.
Region III
In this region, K ∈ (r1, r2]. The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game is (S,S) and only firm
A has a dominant strategy. Applying backward induction leads to the following matrix for period
1:
Firm B
Firm A
S C W
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSSA ,ΠSSB
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
W ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSSA ,ΠSSB
(13)
Here, firm B has a weakly dominant strategy to wait. Because
ΠSSA > Π
CC
A −K
13
holds for any q and K in region III by Lemma 5, firm A will choose either S or W against waiting
by firm B. The Nash equilibria in undominated strategies for matrix (13) are (S,W) and (W,W).
Both yield outcome SS, the same as in the simultaneous game.
Region IV
Region IV turns out to be the most interesting. In this region, K ∈ (r2, r1]. The Nash equilibrium
of the simultaneous game is (S,C) and only firm A has a dominant strategy. Applying backward
induction leads to the following matrix for period 1:
Firm B
Firm A
S C W
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB
W ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
(14)
In this matrix, firm B has a weakly dominant strategy to wait. Firm A will choose C against firm
B’s waiting if
ΠCSA −K ≥ ΠSCA ,
or, equivalently,
K ≤ ΠCSA −ΠSCA =
2
9
.
In this case (C,W) is the unique Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies, with outcome CS.
Note that firm B is worse off compared to the simultaneous game.9 For the other case in which
K > 2/9, (S,W) and (W,W) are Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. Both yield outcome
SC, the same as in the simultaneous game. It is shown in the Appendix that both of the above two
subregions of region IV are non-empty.10
Summary
Let us summarize our analysis of the four regions. For the firm that does not have a dominant
strategy in the simultaneous game, waiting is a weakly dominant strategy in the endogenous-timing
game. Hence, the firm that has a dominant strategy in the simultaneous game (firm B in regions I
and II, firm A in regions III and IV) can potentially enhance its position in the endogenous-timing
game. Indeed, this firm can secure its equilibrium payoff from the simultaneous game by playing its
dominant strategy in period 1 of the endogenous-timing game. However, it can change its payoff by
playing its dominated strategy in period 1. It will do so if that is beneficial. Specifically, we have
the following.
• The firm that has a dominant strategy in the simultaneous game does not benefit from the
9This is because ΠCSA −K ≥ ΠSCA and ΠSCA +ΠSCB > ΠCSA +ΠCSB (Lemma 6) imply ΠCSB −K < ΠSCB .
10Matrix (14) has two Nash equilibria in weakly dominated strategies (S,C) and (W,C), with outcome SC.
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Figure 5: Customization choices in the endogenous-timing game
endogenous-timing game in regions II, III and the upper portion of IV. Both firms receive the
same payoffs in the endogenous-timing game as in the simultaneous game.
• The firm that has a dominant strategy in the simultaneous game benefits from the endogenous-
timing game in regions I and the lower portion of IV. The other firm is also better off in region
I, but is worse off in the lower portion of region IV.
The next proposition points out the differences between equilibrium outcomes in the simultaneous
and endogenous-timing games.
Proposition 2 (Endogenous-timing game versus simultaneous game). The following comparison
holds between the simultaneous and endogenous-timing games.
(i) If 0.63 < q ≤ 2.74 and K ∈ (max{0, c1}, c2], then the endogenous-timing game results in both
firms selecting standard products, whereas in the simultaneous game both firms customize.
(ii) If q > 2.84 and K ∈ (r2,min{r1, 2/9}], then the endogenous-timing game results in firm A
selecting a customized product and firm B selecting a standard product, whereas in the simul-
taneous game the opposite occurs.
For all other parameter configurations the two games yield the same outcome.
Combining the results in this proposition with Figure 3 leads to Figure 5, which presents the
equilibrium customization choices in the endogenous-timing game.
It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that both quality difference and endogenous timing play
important roles in determining the equilibrium outcome. Indeed, if the quality difference is small
(q ≤ 0.56) then no firm customizes in both simultaneous and endogenous-timing games, regardless
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of the level of K. However, when the quality difference is large, firms are sufficiently differentiated.
Customization by one or both firms may occur and the simultaneous and endogenous-timing games
do not always lead to the same outcome. In the endogenous-timing game, the firm that does not
have a dominant strategy in the simultaneous game has an incentive to wait, and the firm that has
a dominant strategy can achieve a different outcome from that of the simultaneous game by playing
its dominated strategy in period 1.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied customization in a model with two firms that are initially differentiated
horizontally and vertically. Customization affects horizontal but not vertical differentiation. When
making their customization decisions, the firms play a two-period endogenous-timing game, in which
each firm either selects its product type in period 1 or postpones this decision to period 2. After
the product types are selected, the firms engage in a price competition.
Both this paper and Loginova and Wang (2008) study customization in the presence of quality
differentiation. The two studies together show that quality difference affects the firms’ equilibrium
customization choices. In particular, no firm will customize if the quality difference is small, regard-
less of the fixed cost of customization. For sufficiently large quality differences, customization by
one or both firms may occur. Because the high quality firm benefits more from customization than
the low quality firm, the high quality firm is more likely to customize.
The present study complements Loginova and Wang (2008) by showing that the timing of cus-
tomization can be used as a strategic tool by the firms. Endogenous timing in customization choices
may enable the firms to achieve a Pareto superior outcome by avoiding a price war that would
follow customization by both firms. This happens when the high quality firm is the only firm with a
dominant strategy in the simultaneous game. While in the simultaneous game the low quality firm
never customizes alone, in the endogenous-timing game it can obtain an advantage by becoming the
first and only firm to customize. This happens when the low quality firm is the only firm with a
dominant strategy in the simultaneous game.
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Appendix
Proofs of Lemmas 1 through 4 appear in Loginova and Wang (2008). (See the Appendix for the
referees at the end of this manuscript.)
Proof of (9). The expressions for c1, c2, r1, and r2 as functions of q follow immediately from Lemmas
1 through 4,
c1 =

(
2
3 − 16q
)2 − 12 (1− 16q)2 , if q ≤ 1
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 12 (1− 16q)2 , if q ∈ (1, 32]
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 1q (1+√1+16q8 )3 , if q ∈ (32 , 3]
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 19q = 19 + 136q , if q > 3
c2 =

1
9q −
(
1
3 − 16q
)2
, if q ≤ 12
1
9q − 116
√
2q, if q ∈ (12 , 2]
1
9q − 1q
(
1
3q − 16
)2 = 19 − 136q , if q > 2
r1 =

(
2
3 +
1
6q
)2 − 12 (1 + 16q)2 , if q ≤ 12
9
16
√
2q − 12
(
1 + 16q
)2
, if q ∈ (12 , 32]
9
16
√
2q −
(
1− 1q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)2) −5+3√1+16q
8 , if q ∈
(
3
2 , 2
]
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2 − (1− 1q (1+√1+16q8 )2) −5+3√1+16q8 , if q ∈ (2, 3]
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2 − 49q = 29 + 136q , if q > 3
and
r2 =
{
4
9q −
(
1
3 +
1
6q
)2
, if q ≤ 1
4
9q − 1q
(
2
3q − 16
)2 = 29 − 136q , if q > 1
Tedious but straightforward numerical calculations confirm that ci < rj for i, j = 1, 2 and any given
value of q.
Proof of Lemma 5. The expressions for ΠSSA and Π
SS
B as functions of q are given in Lemma 1.
Numerical calculations confirm that ΠSSA > Π
CC
A = q/9 and Π
SS
B > Π
CC
B = 4q/9 for q < 3. For
q ≥ 3, ΠSSA = ΠCCA and ΠSSB = ΠCCB .
Proof of Lemma 6. It follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 that
ΠCSA +Π
CS
B =
{
5
9 − 19q + 118q2, if q ≤ 1
1
q
(
5
9q
2 − 19q + 118
)
, if q > 1
and
ΠSCA +Π
SC
B =

5
9 +
1
9q +
1
18q
2, if q ≤ 1/2
5
8
√
2q, if q ∈ (12 , 2]
1
q
(
5
9q
2 + 19q +
1
18
)
, if q > 2
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Obviously
ΠCSA +Π
CS
B > Π
SC
A +Π
SC
B
holds for q ≤ 1/2 and q > 2. Straightforward calculations show that the inequality also holds for
q ∈ (1/2, 2].
Proof of (12). It suffices to show that
ΠSCB −ΠCSB > c1
holds for q > 2.74. Lemmas 2 and 3 imply ΠSCB −ΠCSB = 4/9. Straightforward calculations confirm
that 4/9 > c1 for q > 2.74.
Proof of non-emptiness of the two subregions of region IV. For q > 3,
r1 =
2
9
+
1
36q
and r2 =
2
9
− 1
36q
.
Hence,
r2 <
2
9
< r1,
from which non-emptiness of the two subregions of region IV follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. The results follow immediately from Proposition 1 and the discussion of the
four regions preceding this proposition.
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Appendix for the Referees
Proof of Lemma 1. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 3/2 and suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(a). Straightforward algebra implies
DA(pA, pB) =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
q + pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
2
q + pA − pB
)
in this case. The profit maximizing first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and
profits as in part (i) of the lemma. It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference
line intersects the top and bottom sides of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and
x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− q + pSSB − pSSA
)
=
1
2
(
1− 2
3
q
)
≥ 0,
x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 + pSSB − pSSA
)
=
1
2
(
1 +
1
3
q
)
< 1
hold for q ≤ 3/2. In fact, x̂(1) = 0 when q = 3/2.
(ii) Consider 3/2 < q ≤ 3 and suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the unit square as shown
in Figure 2(b). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
4q
(1 + pB − pA)2 and DB(pA, pB) = 1− 14q (1 + pB − pA)
2 .
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (ii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the left and bottom sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− q + 1
4
(
−3 +
√
1 + 16q
))
< 0,
x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
4
(
−3 +
√
1 + 16q
))
∈ (0, 1]
hold for 3/2 < q ≤ 3. Note that x̂(1) = 0 when q = 3/2 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 3.
(iii) Consider q > 3 and suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(pB − pA) and DB(pA, pB) = 1
q
(q + pA − pB) .
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (iii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides of the unit square.
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Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− 2
3
q
)
< 0 and x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
3
q
)
> 1
hold for q > 3. Note that x̂(0) = 1 when q = 3.
Proof of Lemma 2. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 1 and suppose the indifference line (6) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(a). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) = 1− 12q + pB − pA and DB(pA, pB) =
1
2
q + pA − pB.
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (i) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the top and bottom sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) = 1− q + pCSB − pCSA =
2
3
− 2
3
q ≥ 0 and x̂(0) = 1 + pCSB − pCSA =
2
3
+
1
3
q < 1
hold for q ≤ 1. Note that x̂(1) = 0 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 1.
(ii) Consider q > 1 and suppose the indifference line (6) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
1
2
+ pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
q − 1
2
+ pA − pB
)
.
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (ii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
2
3
− 2
3
q < 0 and x̂(0) =
2
3
+
1
3
q > 1
hold for q > 1. Note that x̂(1) = 0 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 1/2 and suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(a). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) = −12q + pB − pA and DB(pA, pB) = 1 +
1
2
q + pA − pB.
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The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (i) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the top and bottom sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) = −q + pSCB − pSCA =
1
3
− 2
3
q ≥ 0 and x̂(0) = pSCB − pSCA =
1
3
+
1
3
q < 1
hold for q ≤ 1/2. Note that x̂(1) = 0 when q = 1/2.
(ii) Consider 1/2 < q ≤ 2 and suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the unit square as shown
in Figure 2(b). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
2q
(pB − pA)2 and DB(pA, pB) = 1− 12q (pB − pA)
2 .
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (ii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the left and bottom sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed,
x̂(1) = −q + 1
2
√
2q < 0 and x̂(0) =
1
2
√
2q ∈ (0, 1]
hold for 1/2 < q ≤ 2. Note that x̂(1) = 0 when q = 1/2 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 2.
(iii) Consider q > 2 and suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
−1
2
+ pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
q +
1
2
+ pA − pB
)
.
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (iii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
3
− 2
3
q < 0 and x̂(0) =
1
3
+
1
3
q > 1
hold for q > 2. Note that x̂(0) = 1 when q = 2.
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